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The empirical study of reading dates back more than 125 years. But despite this long
tradition, the scientiﬁc understanding of reading has made rather heterogeneous progress:
many factors that inﬂuence the process of text reading have been uncovered, but
theoretical explanations remain fragmented; no general theory pulls together the diverse
ﬁndings. A handful of scholars have noted that properties thought to be at the core
of the reading process do not actually generalize across different languages or from
situations single-word reading to connected text reading. Such observations cast doubt
on many of the traditional conceptions about reading. In this article, I suggest that the
observed heterogeneity in the research is due to misguided conceptions about the reading
process. Particularly problematic are the unreﬁned notions about meaning which undergird
many reading theories: most psychological theories of reading implicitly assume a kind of
elemental token semantics, where words serve as stable units of meaning in a text. This
conception of meaning creates major conceptual problems. As an alternative, I argue
that reading shoud be rather understood as a form of language use, which circumvents
many of the conceptual problems and connects reading to a wider range of linguistic
communication. Finally, drawing from Wittgenstein, the concept of “language games” is
outlined as an approach to language use that can be operationalized scientiﬁcally to provide
a new foundation for reading research.
Keywords: reading research, natural reading, meaning, language use, language games
LANGUAGE USE AND READING – WHY BOTHER?
Reading is a “culturally cognitive” phenomenon that sets humans
apart from other intelligent creatures. Theoretically, reading is
interesting because it is a learned practice that incorporates many
human capacities; from basic processes of visual perception to
abstract cognitive skills such as reasoning, imagination, and cre-
ativity. The ability to read and comprehend texts has become a
key necessity for participation in contemporary society: it is a pre-
requisite for all forms of higher education (Rindermann and Ceci,
2009), and has direct consequences for health and life expectancy
(Pignone and DeWalt, 2006). Accordingly, the empirical investi-
gation of the reading process has one of the longest traditions in
experimental psychology, dating back more than 125 years.
However, despite this long tradition, the scientiﬁc understand-
ing of reading has made rather heterogeneous progress: much
progress has been made in uncovering many facts about read-
ing, highlighting how linguistic, individual and situational factors
inﬂuence the process of reading under certain circumstances.
However, this progress in gathering facts about reading and its
constituent factors has not been complemented by a similar the-
oretical progress that pulls together the observed facts. This is
reﬂected in the complex patterns of contextual effects on reading
behavior that pervade the scientiﬁc literature (Van Orden et al.,
2001) and a rather fragmented theoretical landscape (Rayner and
Reichle, 2010).
Moreover, and in addition to the problems inherited from
strict experimental investigations, recent ﬁndings on connected
text reading, literary reading, and cross-language investigations of
reading have started to gnaw at the edges of accepted assumptions,
as they seem to indicate that some of the major theoretical com-
mitments in most of reading research – such as the primacy of the
word level, the importance of lexical features, or the assumption
that words have a deﬁnite meaning – do not apply to naturalistic,
or at least more complex reading situations.
In this essay, I explore the possibility that the observed het-
erogeneity and non-convergence in reading research is due to a
somewhat misguided conception of the reading process: up to
now, reading research has been very much concerned with the
front-end of the reading process (i.e., how visual features can be
correctly identiﬁed as words) and the search for general mech-
anisms that are invariant across contexts (Pollatsek et al., 2003).
Conceptually, reading is seen as a rather passive process. Other
ﬁelds that concern themselves with how language works, such as
the philosophy of language or interaction and communication
research, have largely moved on from a strict mechanistic view to
a usage-based view of language. In a nutshell, this means that the
function of linguistic tokens have no life of their own, but are ﬁrst
and foremost subject to temporal and contextual factors, turning
the theoretical priorities of contemporary reading research on its
head.
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In what follows, I will discuss the possibility that the theoretical
priorities in psychological reading research have to be reconsid-
ered. Especially, that some of the theoretical core-commitments of
contemporary reading research might be incommensurable with
necessary assumptions about reading as a language phenomenon.
To explain my reasoning, I will ﬁrst give a brief description of
what would seem to be indispensable ingredients of reading as
a phenomenon that would probably be agreed upon by the vast
majority of psychologists, philosophers and scholars of literature.
Then, I will summarize the core-commitments of contemporary
research on reading and evaluate how these commitments relate
to the minimal core-assumptions one has to make for reading as a
language phenomenon. Based on this review, I will conclude that
the empirical results and fundamental concerns about meaning
are somewhat at odds with the current core-assumptions of read-
ing research. And furthermore that the conceptual problems that
arise in this context might be solved by adopting a more usage-
based view on reading, where reading is conceptualized less as
a translational process that “maps printed words into the mind,”
but more as a “one-and-a-half-person dialog” of sorts. I will ﬁn-
ish by picking up Wittgenstein’s concept of “language games” and
describe how this concept can be used as a linchpin for a general
understanding of communicative processes, linking reading with
online communication, and how this allows the deduction of the
concept of “reading games”, that can potentially serve as a new
core-foundation for reading research in empirical investigation of
the reading process.
WHAT IS READING FOR?
Reading and writing are relatively recent cultural developments:
the earliest records of the precursors of writing data back to
cave paintings roughly 20,000 years old, and the ﬁrst traces of
proto-writing appeared 3,400 BC in the Middle East, the Proto-
Cuneiform. This pictographic form seems to have been ﬁrst
invented for bookkeeping purposes. In an interesting way simi-
lar to rather modern developments of emailing and texting, these
communications were of a rather short lived nature: as Nissen
(1993) notes “After authorized individuals have broken sealed
stoppers of collars in order to gain access (. . .), the fragmented
sealings may have been kept somewhere for control purposes but
then lost their purpose and were consequently disposed of. Writ-
ten documents were unquestionably treated in the same way. They
served to carry out future check (. . .). After a certain time had
lapsed, this information was no longer useful. Concequently, the
tables were probably thrown away in regular intervals (. . .) (p. 6).”
Hence, early instances of reading and writing were much more
connected to their environment, serving rather direct, sign-post
like functions.
It took at about another 600 years for the ﬁrst appearance of
coherent texts that would qualify as literature (Grimbly, 2013),
and yet roughly another 1000 years until the ﬁrst alphabetic lan-
guages appeared (Sampson, 1985). These developments in the
conventionalization of writing systems ﬁnally served to estab-
lish writings as a more permanent medium for communication
across broader scales, where authors could present their thoughts
to an increasingly bigger audience. Finally, printing techniques
allowed for increasingly efﬁcient multiplication and simultaneous
distribution to several places at once – broadening the space for
communication.
Through writing, authors could preserve their thoughts, allow-
ing communication on new temporal scales, even past the lifespan
of an author. Besides this one-author-one-reader relationship,
reading of texts also tied in with online communication between
groups of people, asmany individuals couldnow read the same text
and discuss, interpret, and act upon its content (for example, the
concept of the newspaper, or the air-dropping of pamphlets dur-
ing war time). Of course, modern informational technology has
also created a space in-between those two – the classical reading
situation and the classical form of online communication – where
emails, short messages, and chats allow a more fast-paced, tightly
coupled exchange that uses reading and writing as means to trans-
port content within the setting of online communication. Hence,
it seems generally acceptable to say “Reading (and writing) is a
form of communication, and it evolved to serve a communicative
function.”
Furthermore, we can reﬁne this statement, by specifying
more how reading (and writing) goes about serving that com-
municative function in a basic way, which is by providing a
speciﬁc medium, a visual symbol system/writing system that
transports content. This is a general aspect that reading shares
with all other forms of communication, that transport con-
tent by means of some medium – for example, the sound
of the voice during reading aloud (but also visual aspects,
such as gestures, facial expressions, etc.). Hence, we can say:
“Reading is an activity necessary for “accessing” content from
the communicative medium of the writing system – neces-
sary in order to “use” a writing system as a communicative
medium.”
In the end, one could also say that for something to be labeled
a successful communication – or indeed communication at all as
opposed to mere activity (and similar to the distinction between
action and behavior) – “meaning” needs to be present, or that an
activity needs to be meaningful.
What has been said so far might seem trivial, or commonly
agreeable upon, but we will see that the details of how these
aspects of reading are understood in particular will make quite
a difference. We will need some space to unpack this second state-
ment – relating the process of reading to meaning – because it
will turn out to be more complicated and in the end maybe more
disagreeable than it seems at ﬁrst glance. It will also mark the
ﬁrst departure of how core-assumptions in psychological read-
ing research are understood or implemented compared to other
ﬁelds, such as interaction and communication research. The high-
lighted terms “assess” and “use” stand for different ideas of how
one can think about how texts work and will ultimately relate to
some notion of “meaning”. In the next section, I will review how
ideas of “access”, “content” and “meaning” are related in contem-
porary reading research, and how they seem to be understood and
practically implemented in that ﬁeld.
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON READING – “CRACKING THE
ORTHOGRAPHIC CODE”
How has reading been conceived in psychology? The earliest sys-
tematic investigations of reading probably come from the work of
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Cattell (1886a,b), who investigated reading on the letter, word, and
sentence level using tachistoscopic methods. His research revealed
somebasic facts about reading that have stood the test of time fairly
well, for example that readers can read longer letter strings when
these are grouped into real words, as opposed to being random
concatenations of letters, and that the latency in sounding out a
monosyllabic word is shorter compared to sounding out a single
letter. Based on these ﬁndings, his conclusion was that reading was
a synthetic process, in which a word was read and recognized by a
reader as a whole.
These and their own ﬁndings prompted Erdmann and Dodge
(1898) to formulate a “total shape” theory of reading, describ-
ing skilled reading as holistic recognition of words. In particular,
they presented evidence that skilled readers that are familiar with
a speciﬁc vocabulary can identify words as long as 22-letters reli-
ably within very short exposure times of 100 ms (the experiments
were conducted in German, where it is possible to compound
several words, especially nouns, into a single word). As Scheerer
(1981) points out, this prompted one of the ﬁrst great theoreti-
cal debates about the reading process, because Wundt (who had –
up to that point – not been particularly interested in empirical
reading research), doubted that this was possible. In particu-
lar, Wundt (1900) thought that the effective presentation time of
words in the tachistoscope was prolonged by after-image effects,
and that multiple shifts of attention must have occurred on sub-
strings of these extremely long words in order to successfully read
them.
The crux of this debate was, whether reading is basically an
analytic process (where local details of a word need to be visually
analyzed ﬁrst in order to successfully read it), or a synthetic process
(where the word is read as a whole), and this debate came to
dominate the theoretical discourse of reading researchers well into
the 1960s (Gibson and Levin, 1975).
Another line of reading research that started at the turn of the
century was that of eye-movements during reading (Huey, 1908).
Early investigations of eye-movements did not directly address
the issue of analytic versus synthetic reading, as it was clear that
the visual span around foveal vision during a ﬁxation could easily
provide information about longer words, even if they were only
ﬁxated once. Hence, the shifts of attention that Wundt proposed
were unlikely to reveal themselves as a pattern of multiple ﬁxa-
tions within a single word. In any case, this research seemed to
corroborate the notion of reading as a discrete, word-by-word
identiﬁcation process, whereby individual words are ﬁxated in
sequence, and the duration of a ﬁxation was indicative of the skill
of a reader (see Quantz, 1897, for the ﬁrst investigations of skilled
reading using the eye-voice span).
Eventually, the debate about word reading as an analytic versus
synthetic process was tried to be settled by the introduction of
dual-route models (Coltheart, 1978), which incorporated both
processes into a single theory of word reading. The basic idea
was the reading of a word could either go through a direct route,
where the “total shape” of the word was being directly mapped
to its representation in the mental lexicon (synthetic reading), or
it could go through an indirect route, were the individual letters
of the word needed to be recognized and the phonology of that
word was reconstructed though its spelling and could be used to
map the word to its representation in the mental lexicon (analytic
reading). Furthermore, the dual route models also incorporated
reading speed as a fundamental variable, as it was hypothesized
that the direct route would permit faster word reading compared
to the indirect route.
Direct access was assumed to be faster, but contingent on the
reader’s familiarity with the word read (Doctor and Coltheart,
1980). This familiarity effect could be captured by the frequency
with which a word appears in a language, as a stand-in for the
average memory strength evoked by that word for the average
reader. Accordingly, word frequency became a central variable
that was important for all well-developed reading models, either
as an explanatory principle or as a fact to be explained, no matter
their speciﬁc architecture (Grainger and Jacobs, 1996; Coltheart
et al., 2001; Pollatsek et al., 2003; Engbert et al., 2005). Many more
lexical variables that described word properties have been subse-
quently described in an attempt to ﬁnd the set of relevant lexical
word properties that would allow a reader to “crack the ortho-
graphic code” and map the visual features of a word to its internal
representation.
In general, theories of reading in psychology have been con-
cerned with this “front end” of the reading process, and tried to
describe invariant relationships that would permit a reader to map
a word to the mental lexicon. Implicitly or explicitly, it seems as
if comprehension of a word has been loosely equated with the
success of the mapping of word and representation, where the
meaning of the word is stored. This way meaning is explicitly tied
to the level of words. The (semantic) content of a word equals its
meaning. Of course, the number of deﬁnitions of meaning of a
word are many, but in the end, meaning is treated as a stable word
property, at best locally and incrementally developing and only
subject to peripheral context effects. When meaning is accepted to
be given, then it makes sense to focus on the processes that lead up
to it – hence, the focus on “access” (in a broad sense) of the con-
tent of a word – or in other words, the focus on how readers crack
the orthographic code of a piece of written language. Under the
hand, this perhaps implicit view of meaning in reading is one of
a word semantics, where the stable, well-deﬁnable building blocks
of meaning reside on the word level, and any higher forms of
meaning can – one way or the other – be reduced to that level.
Meaning of any complexity can be decomposed into its elements,
its words.
This is not only reﬂected in the architecture of theories and
models of reading, but also in the experimental procedures that are
utilized in reading research: here, the focus on isolated words and
sentences was deemed sufﬁcient, as they seemed to encapsulate the
essentials of written language comprehension: words contain the
basic meanings and lexical constituents of written language, while
the syntactical features of a language can be sufﬁciently tabulated
within a single sentence (Wallot and Van Orden, 2011). Following
this logic, the investigation of isolated words and sentences was
thought to contain the potential to uncover the general rules of
written language perception.
Just as a little hint at this point: the idea of “language-use” as
it is conceptualized in contemporary philosophy and interaction
studies does not easily ﬁt into this picture. If anything, it seems
that the most plausible interpretation of the term language use
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in the contemporary view of reading research would be, that it
captures the dynamics of the reading process, which in turn would
be (entirely) deﬁned by the sequence of the properties of its word-
constituents.
However, thinking about the concept of “language use” in read-
ing at this point would be premature, as we have not yet answered
the question of why this should be interesting or even relevant.
In order to do so, we will concern ourselves with the following
two questions in the following two sections: (1) How did the out-
lined research program in reading research fare so far with its
focus on the word level? (2) Given that meaning is a central and
ultimately necessary ingredient for reading as a phenomenon, are
these assumptions of psychological models and theories in line
with plausible deﬁnitions of meaning that have been much more
pondered upon in the philosophy of language?
STATE-OF-THE-ART: DO WORD PROPERTIES REVEAL A
FUNDAMENTAL LEVEL OF READING?
The experimental investigation of reading has been heavily focus-
ing on stimuli sets of no more than a few words, with studies
that are explicitly aimed at more naturalistic text reading encom-
passing a handful of sentences at the most (Clifton and Duffy,
2001). And indeed, some basic features of the reading process
(such as the ﬁxation-saccade-sequence in reading) suggested that
reading is inherently word reading. The process of text reading
appears very complex, and many reading researchers feel that
quite a reduction of complexity is necessary before systematic
investigations of reading are possible. Interestingly, Wundt (1911)
also argued that an experimental analysis of complex intellec-
tual functions such as reading demanded such a reduction, but
he argued that an experimental investigation of the linguistic
processes involved in reading might escape such an experimen-
tal analysis, and rather needed non-experimental methodologies
(Scheerer, 1981).
Contemporary reading researchers are also aware of this ten-
sion. For example, Rayner and Pollatsek (1994) state that “Critics
of the information-processing approach often argue that attempts
to isolate component processes of reading result in tasks verymuch
unlike reading. (. . .) Admittedly, [many of] these tasks are unlike
reading (p. 8).” However, either due to lack of attractive alterna-
tives or as the expression of an optimistic attitude toward scientiﬁc
progress, the current sentiment still seems to be: “Suppose we are
interested in studying walking. If we study the motor responses
that people make when they take two steps, critics may say, “But
that’s not walking. When you walk you go a long way.” True, but
are the motor responses any different when you take two steps?
Undoubtely not” (again Rayner and Pollatsek, 1994, p. 8).
Whether one agrees or not, there has certainly been good rea-
son for this linguistic sparcity in reading research, because the basic
lexical and syntactical features already show complicated interac-
tion effects with each other. For example, a reaction time recorded
by a key-press to read the word “pepper” is on average faster if the
word “pepper” is preceded by a semantically related word, such
as “salt,” compared to a control condition where “pepper” is pre-
ceded by an unrelated word (Neely et al., 1998). However, if “salt”
is presented twice in succession, just before “pepper” appears, this
facilitative effect vanishes.
All simple reading tasks reveal such complicated patterns of
interactions among the factors that are studied in reading research
(Van Orden et al., 2001; Pickering et al., 2013), and these inter-
actions are not just limited to the scale of word reading: while,
for example, Kintsch and Keenan (1973) found that reading times
increase linearly with the syntactic complexity of a sentence, more
recent research by Keller et al. (2001) found that this effect is actu-
ally dependent on the lexical features of the constituent words of
a sentence (i.e., word frequency).
This cursory example might not appear troublesome on its
own. However, they are no exceptions to the rule, but are symp-
tomatic for the current state-of-affairs in reading research: Van
Orden and Kloos (2005) provide an in-depth discussion of the
complicated interaction effects observed in single-word reading
research on the role of phonology in reading (see also Van Orden
et al., 2001). Intuitively, phonology seems a potentially important
aspect of reading, because the development of reading usually
follows the development of speech, and because the majority of
writing systems incorporate some form of phonological coding
into their orthography. Accordingly, as has been described above,
phonology is assumed to be an important mediator in the reading
process, for example described in the indirect route in dual-process
theories (Coltheart, 1978).
In their review, Van Orden and Kloos (2005) argue that effects
of phonology in the reading process are fundamentally contingent
on the task demandswithin a speciﬁc reading task that is employed
to investigate reading, and that this “task condingent evidence,
instead of settling the debate [about the role of phonology in
reading] simply fuels it (p. 63).”
One example area thatVanOrden andKloos (2005) discuss and
that illustrates the pervasiveness of complex interaction effects
in reading is the case of homophone errors: homophones are
words that sound like another word when spoken, but differ
in spelling, which creates conﬂicting responses from readers –
for example in a categorization task, when the words “break”
versus “brake” should be categorized as “part of a car.” Skilled
readers make homophone errors irrespective of their familiar-
ity, which seemed to falsify the dual process theory where highly
familiar words should be recognized via the direct access route
that does not incorporate mediating phonology, and it could
be concluded that phonology does not matter. However, when
the breadth of the category in a categorization task is changed,
then readers make more homophone errors for unfamiliar com-
pared to familiar words (Jared and Seidenberg, 1991) indicating
that phonology does matter differently for both routes. Whether
homophone effects appear in a reading task also depends on
other task aspects, such as the general difﬁculty of the task
(Lukatela and Turvey, 1994) or reader’s skill (Unsworth and
Pexman, 2003).
As Van Orden and Kloos (2005) conclude, the problem is
that reading reveals itself as an ultra-sensitive phenomenon where
different aspects of tasks and readers depend on each other. Fur-
thermore, the addition of further factors will rather complicate
matters: as the number of factors that are incorporated into the
design of reading tasks increases, so does the number of inter-
actions among those factors. Hence, the exquisitely complicated
relations between the different factors in reading can never be
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stably pinned down (at least so far it has not been). Paradox-
ically, the attempt to identify and isolate the mechanisms that
serve as building blocks of the reading process rather gives rise
to the conclusion that given circumstance, everything matters.
Without being able to pinpoint reliably what matters when, one
effectively confronts a situation where “everything is dependent
on everything else.”
Regarding the case of phonology in reading, this means that
the question cannot be settled. Ideally, laboratory tasks would
reveal a robust role for phonology throughout, but given that they
don’t, the question has not found a satisfactory answer and creates
circumstances in which scientist are not so much informed by
the evidence, but rather have to choose which evidence should be
given priority (Van Orden et al., 2001). Similar problems have also
appeared in the study of reading disorders, where dyslexic readers
were found to deviate fromnormal readers in innumerable aspects
of cognitive measures, such as basic perceptual ability, working
memory, attention, or temporal processing, but at the same time,
none of thesemeasures by themselves provide a sufﬁcient criterion
for the diagnosis of dyslexia (Wijnants et al., 2012). This persistent
non-convergence of ﬁndings from laboratory research on reading
has been noticed long since (Van Orden et al., 2003), and reﬂected
in critical assertions that a general theory of reading is nowhere in
sight despite a more than 100-year research effort (Rayner, 1998;
Rayner and Reichle, 2010).
However, it is important to point out clearly onemore time that
this state of affairs is already observed in carefully controlled exper-
imental laboratory tasks of reading, and no research program was
ever conducted to systematically investigate whether these tasks
capture a process that is anywhere akin to naturalistic reading.
One of the challenges for reading research in the near future will
be to weed-out which of the tasks that were used in laboratory
settings to study reading actually generalize to more naturalistic
reading situations – and which ones are really only conﬁned to a
laboratory life of their own (Hunt and Vipond, 1991; McNerney
et al., 2011; Wallot et al., 2013). Three interesting aspects of read-
ing have come to the light of day that seem to question whether
reading research has placed its bets on good assumptions: (1) The
role of idiosyncrasies in reading, (2) the generalization of research
ﬁndings across different languages, and (3) the generalization of
results of laboratory research to more naturalistic text reading
situations.
Idiosyncrasies in reading behavior are long-since known in psy-
chology (Rayner, 1998). What is understood to be an idiosyncratic
process does not even lie in the realm of individual interpretations
of a text or the like. Rather, what is meant are systematic quanti-
tative or qualitative differences in measures of the reading process
between individuals, such as which particular passages in a text
evokes emotional responses during reading, how readers move
their eyes across a text (for example with few, long ﬁxations ver-
sus many short ﬁxations during reading), how often or not they
re-read passages of a text, or simply how they differ in reading
speed (Miall and Kuiken, 1994; Rayner and Pollatsek, 1994). Even
the latter, simple measure can reveal astonishing differences. For
example, in a study of text reading of mine (Wallot et al., 2013),
participants read simple ﬁctional prose. None of the participants
knew the text beforehand, and all were college students, literate
native readers in the language the text was presented in. All partic-
ipants had to answer a comprehension questionnaire after reading.
On average, reading of the text took at about one hour. However,
it took the slowest reader almost 2.5 h to read the text, while the
fastest reader went through it in a little more than 17 min. Yet,
both of them were perfectly able to answer the administered com-
prehension questionnaire (i.e., answering all questions correctly).
However, current theories of reading are inherently theories of
the average reader. Neither quantitative (such as reading speed),
nor qualitative (such eye-movement patterns) idiosyncratic reader
differences ﬁnd any deep consideration in the well-developed the-
ories and models of reading (Grainger and Jacobs, 1996; Coltheart
et al., 2001; Pollatsek et al., 2003; Engbert et al., 2005). Moreover,
these idiosyncrasies can usually only be observed in somewhat
naturalistic or at least complex reading tasks that boast at least a
little bit of degrees of freedom for the reader, such as connected
text with an overarching or emergent meaning (Hunt andVipond,
1991; Sikora et al., 2011). However, reading tasks – like most of the
tasks utilized in experimental psychology – are explicitly designed
to minimize idiosyncratic behavior as much as possible, and in
so far as idiosyncrasies make for differences in the reading pro-
cess or between reading outcomes, they show up as an error term
in the experimental study of reading. Current research does not
seem to have the conceptual tools to deal with strong idiosyncratic
processes in reading, because it requires that the reading process
is fundamentally the same across people in the details of how it
works, and individual differences are often seen as obstacles that
are in the way of such a kind of understanding (Lupker et al.,
1997).
While the case of idiosyncratic reading behavior hints at the
limits of the current framework that searches for context-free
mechanisms, this framework has been put more directly to the
test in cross-linguistic investigations of reading: a recent debate
has sparked around reading universals, that is, around the aspects
of the reading process that are invariant across languages and
reading situations (Frost, 2012). After all, if a well-deﬁnable,
context-independent cognitive architecture supports reading as
a cognitive activity, then these building blocks should be the
same no matter the language. This also follows from our gen-
eral consideration, that reading has evolved as a means for human
communication via written texts, and that no matter the spe-
ciﬁc details of a writing system, all these systems are powerful
enough to express the same ideas and ideas of the same degree
of complexity. It has turned out that what were thought to be
basic building blocks of the reading process, such as letter posi-
tion invariance within a word, do not occur the same way across
languages. For example, new research showed that the reading
process is relatively robust to the scrambling of the letter posi-
tions in a word, pointing to a fundamental property of the mental
(and neurophysiological) processes during reading (Frost, 2012).
However, it was subsequently shown that this is mostly a phe-
nomenon of European languages, but does not pertain to other
languages such as Hebrew, where letter position is of great impor-
tance (Velan and Frost, 2007; Velan et al., 2013) – and we want,
for now, to cast aside the question of what a concept such as letter
position would mean for logosyllabic languages, such as Mandarin
Chinese.
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Another strong motivation for a reconsideration of the current
framework in reading research comes froma few recent studies that
have investigated in how far the putatively basic constituents of the
reading process that have been identiﬁed in laboratory research
actually apply to more naturalistic reading, that is, reading of con-
nected texts. To that end, lexical variables such as word frequency
during reading of connected text of several 100 or 1000 words
were investigated. As we have discussed above, the word frequency
effect is quite central in contemporary reading research, and states
that words that occur more often in a language (i.e., possess a
higher word frequency) are read faster. Word frequency is thought
to capture a mapping between the visual appearance of a word
and the associated memory strength for that word, again resting
on the assumption of a word-level-semantics where the meaning
of a word can be deﬁned as a stable and elementary property in
written language (Coltheart et al., 2001).
In two studies using different text and reader populations
(Wallot et al., 2013; Wallot et al., accepted), it turned out that lex-
ical variables such as word frequency explain only around a 0.001
to 1.0% of the observed variance in reading times (compared to
10–25% that are commonly observed in experimental studies on
reading). So more is different, and taking two steps in a row might
after all not be so similar to a days march – at least in the case of
reading words and texts.
Other variables of principle theories of reading in psychology
have not fared better when applied in the context of text reading
(such as situation model variables that capture central aspects of
sentence-level reading – McNerney et al., 2011). This strongly sug-
gest, that if one wants to build a theory of reading, then perhaps
other avenues have to be pursued – or as the authors of another
study that investigated the transfer for psychological theories to
connected text reading put it: “(. . .) we suggest, perhaps not sur-
prisingly, that there is continued room for theoretical development
to better capture the qualities of language that inﬂuence the ease
with which it is understood” (McNerney et al., 2011).
Of course, the question is, where to look for new room? Maybe
the right components of the reading process have simply not yet
been found, and another lexical or sub-lexical feature will even-
tually solve the current problems. Alternatively, the very kind of
stability that is expected of language and texts in reading research
and the very basic assumptions of what reading really is might
have to be reconsidered. In the next section, we want to pursue
the second route, trying to evaluate the plausibility of some of
the principle assumptions about reading that have been made in
psychological reading research.
DO WORDS HAVE MEANING?
As laid out before, contemporary psychology of reading views text
as a decomposable communication, decomposable on the word
level. That is, that stable word properties exist, and understanding
of written text is ﬁrst and foremost a decoding problem. This view
of texts ﬁnds its complement in the component-processes in per-
ception (e.g., word reading times, ﬁxations, pronunciation times)
and cognitive architecture (e.g., the mental lexicon) that mirror
and match the supposed word-level structure of the text and vice
versa (Wallot and Kelty-Stephen, 2014). As I noted above, the
matching of a visual input of a word to its representation seems
to satisfy the act of comprehending that word in contemporary
reading research (a view that even seems to be shared by critics
of the contemporary account – cf. Van Orden and Kloos, 2005).
However, the lexical features that provide the informational basis
for this mapping of visual input to representation are fairly static
(within the human life-span), and for them to be of any value
in this decoding process, the other end, that is the meaning of a
word, needs to be similarly stable and static as well. The ques-
tion is, whether such a view of meaning in written language is
plausible – or asked differently: how can we say that words have
meaning?
Before discussing the problem, a note is in order: clearly, if
meaning is central to reading, then a deﬁnition of meaning is
necessary in order to make headway toward a thorough theory of
reading. My intuition is that a viable deﬁnition of meaning would
need to go beyond language, and would need to have a wider basis
in the interactions between organism and their environment (e.g.,
Turvey and Carello, 1981), also given that this has once been at
the origin of reading and writing (Nissen, 1993). The problem
of deﬁning meaning is nothing that I will address in the current
article, however, but it is also not necessary for the argument
I want to make: what I want to examine is merely the option-
space that one has to provide a workable deﬁnition of meaning
(for written language), and whether this option space includes
the possibility of deﬁning meaning in terms of elemental features
of words, or put differently: irrespectively of the current state of
reading research, and even if one could simplywish for the ﬁndings
that reading experiments would produce, would it make sense to
deﬁne meaning as a stable property of words, which is required
if one wants to explicate a theory of reading that is driven by
objective features of written language.
As we have laid out, reading serves a communicative process
and hence, reading ultimately needs to be about meaning. Fur-
thermore, as I have tried to show, the psychology of reading
conceives its basic constituents of a text and the perceptual and
mental processes that act upon it mainly on the word level, and
since these constituents need to be stable and context independent,
this needs to be the level where meaning resides, encapsulated in
words. There are several instantiations of how word meanings
can be conceptualized in the different reading models, but the
different versions are equivalent in that they seem to assume a
locally deﬁnable meaning that will at best incrementally change
in iterative learning processes1. The dominant ideas are that in
a ﬁrst step, there needs to be an associative process that relates
visual word properties to some inner memory trace, such as pro-
vided by conceptual or neural networks. This way, the visual
features that make up a word are connected to the word’s content
(=meaning).
Several organizations of meaning of words have been proposed:
either in the form of a mental lexicon, that possesses entries that
are elemental meaning (i.e., the word “w1” has meaning “m1”) or
deﬁnitions (i.e., the word “w1” possesses the deﬁnition “[w2, w3,
1Just as a side note, one has to say that it is not the case that psychological investi-
gations did not also ﬁnd evidence that word meaning is more ﬂexible than that –
or of changes within a single “learning instance” or less – however, these ﬁndings
have persistently remained outside of the scope of the dominant and well-developed
theories of reading in psychology.
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w4]”). The deﬁnition can be a well-deﬁned set of words (such as
in strict views of the mental lexicon) or again some form of an
associative network or matrix (where weights potentially connect
one word to all other words, for example reﬂected in higher-
dimensional theories of language such as HAL or LSA (Lund and
Burgess, 1996; Landauer et al., 1998). Either way, the end product
needs to yield a stable word content in order to lawfully connect
the lexical word features to a word’s meaning.
Hence, the ﬁrst question we need to ask is whether writ-
ten language is decomposable into elemental meanings (on the
word level)? The question of meaning has not been discussed in
abundance among psychological researchers (Schvaneveldt, 2004).
However, one can ﬁnd occasionally a reference to Frege’s work,
citing his axiom of composability (Bußmann, 1996) that states
that the (literal) meaning of a sentence is composed of the mean-
ing of its constituent words and their syntactical arrangement in
the sentence. However, on a closer look, Frege’s thought on lan-
guage is a little more complex than his axiom of composability
suggests, for Frege complemented his axiom of composability
with the axiom of context dependence, according to which a
word cannot be deﬁned or understood without knowing the
sentence in which it is embedded in. At ﬁrst glance, these two
axioms seem contradictory. However, this contradiction can be
resolved if one does not insist on the priority of the axiom of
composability: if one knows the sentence in which words are
embedded in, one can provide the meaning or deﬁnition for
those words as they are used in the sentence. This seems an
acceptable statement, and is one that could in principle be for-
malized, for example in impredicative logic (Aczel, 1988), and
hence this resolution might even suit itself for a formal descrip-
tion of meaning in text2. The problem is, however, that this
solution also does away with the word level as the basic level
of the text and a basic level for the reading process – and with
words as the carrier of a stable, well-deﬁnable and elemental
meaning.
Another philosopher of language that was concerned with an
elemental, stable level of meaning was Wittgenstein in his early
work (Wittgenstein, 1922/1983). He proposed the idea of elemen-
tal sentences that form stable units of meaning (i.e., basic facts).
However, as the term “elemental sentence” already conveys, the
elements of meaning here are rather situated on the level of state-
ments, incorporating relations between words in a sentence – not
as a kind of elemental meanings in the sense of a word-token-
semantics, but by virtue of a second step that relates the words
to each other by virtue of their membership in that sentence. A
word canonly be considered as“elemental sentences”under certain
circumstances, and, as Wittgenstein reasoned, the elemental sen-
tences cannot be further reduced to their constituents (=words)
and still be meaningful. This is due to the symbolic quality of
words, that makes them arbitrary units (a view of language with
which many reading researchers would agree). They are mere
replacement characters, variables in a logical relationship, and
2For the sake of clarity, it should be noted here that such a kind of formalization
would not lead to a simple primacy of one axiom over another, or the sentence level
over the word level, but would rather yield a mutual relationship between the two,
but a relationship where one level cannot be reduced to the other.
can as such not be meaningful, because an arbitrary symbol does
by deﬁnition not have a speciﬁc meaning. Accordingly, arbitrary
symbols that stand in some relationship to each other will also not
be meaningful.
This insight is a major problem for the conception of meaning
in many reading theories: what all their conceptions of meaning
have in commonarenot only that they are elemental, usually on the
word level, but also that they are situated within a closed symbolic
system: meaning is deﬁned within a closed symbolic system either
as an elemental relation (the meaning of word “w1”= “m1”), or
as a composed deﬁnition (the meaning of word “w1”= “w2, w3,
w4”). And as Wittgenstein also points out, a deﬁnition of a word
bymeremeans of other words completes in the end a perfectly tau-
tological cycle devoid of meaning. Substituting explicit deﬁnition
by associations will also not solve the problem, for as Høffding
already pointed out for the case of perception, associations alone
cannot do any work, cannot create intelligence (Calkins, 1896) –
or meaning. How to solve the problem?
USING LANGUAGE
We left off with Wittgenstein’s description of the problem that
meaning cannot be gotten within an encapsulated system of logi-
cal relations among symbolic constituents. How did Wittgenstein
solve the problem? In his early work, Wittgenstein postulated a
so-called picture theory of meaning (Wittgenstein, 1922/1983),
stating that language is only in so far meaningful, as it refers
to a fact, states-of-affairs in the world. With regards to the
word-semantics view of meaning that seems to characterize
contemporary reading research, the picture theory of meaning
provides a twofold extension: ﬁrst, it upscales the level of stabil-
ity from the word-meaning-level to the level of statements. This
is necessary, because in order to refer to states-of-affairs in the
world, single words will usually not sufﬁce, but a set of words
and their relations to each other are necessary to provide sufﬁ-
cient reference. Second, it brings in meaning as a property that
is co-determined by an environment outside of language, out-
side of a text, not within it. The interaction with the world is
now a necessary precondition for meaning in language, a view
that is also held by for example (Gibsonian) ecological psychology
(Turvey and Carello, 1985). Still, there are also similarities: after
all, Wittgenstein’s early thinking revolved around elemental sen-
tences that describe states-of-affairs in the world as facts – basic
facts, that are stable. And as soon as a proper reference (i.e., a
proper sentence) has been constructed to speciﬁcally refer to a
fact, it provides a meaningful building block. Hence, one could
now search to operationalize elemental sentences (instead of ele-
mental word properties) for a theory of reading. However, the idea
of a basic meaning on the level of elemental sentences has received
two blows. One with the general demise of logical positivism,
more speciﬁcally the problems of veriﬁcation (Popper, 2005),
complicating the idea of a fact as a basic and stably describable
property of the outside world. Another one with the develop-
ment of Wittgenstein’s own thoughts about language in his late
work.
In the Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein, 1953/2010),
Wittgenstein expands and in parts revises his earlier positions. In
further exploring the role of linguistic and non-linguistic context
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in language understanding, he arrives at a more complicated pic-
ture of meaning, that is not even stable on the level of elemental
sentences, but is inherently dependent on context. Wittgenstein
shows that there is a great number of contextual layers above the
word or sentence level that need to be taken into account in order
to know what a word or a sentence means (such as the larger set
of utterances or paragraphs a sentence is embedded in, the shared
individual and cultural history between interlocutors or readers,
authors and texts, or the affordances of the actual and remote envi-
ronment in which communication takes place). This now removes
us very far from ideas of a general kind of meaning that could be
encapsulated with small bits of written language, and moves us
more into the realm of communication science and social inter-
action, that have picked up language use as a fundamental idea in
communication. In a somewhat negative wording of the concept,
one cannot get the meaning of a word or statement with knowing
how it is used in a particular instance.
In communication research, the idea of language use refers to
a great many different ways in which contextual constraints are
effective or are utilized by interlocutors to arrive at a meaning-
ful exchange. Some examples are the establishment of common
ground, patterns of turn-taking during conversation, non-verbal
clues and gestures, or linguistic alignment during conversation
(Clark, 1996; Pickering and Garrod, 2004). These concepts are
inherently relational and are not so much based on meaningful
elements in language, but rather establish meaning by virtue of
arranging and re-arranging the elements. Their relational quality
is absolute in that if one removes from or exchanges one inter-
locutor or some relevant environmental feature in a conversation,
they cannot be deﬁned anymore in the same way or change their
meaning.
Arriving this way at language use as a fundamental aspect of
sense making casts up two problems for the current discussion
of meaning: ﬁrst, all these aspects of language use have been
described for communication during online interaction, which is
at the surface not quite how reading looks like – at least one needs
to motivate an analogous way of conceiving the reading process.
Second, among all the many aspects of language use in social inter-
action, how canwe ﬁnd a feature of language use that seems readily
applicable to the reading situation and can be thought of as a fun-
damental aspect of language use in reading? Regarding the ﬁrst
question, i.e., how to motivate the analogy to language, we can ask
whether there are certain similarities between the process of online
communication (such as dialog) and the process of reading, that
put the two in the same ball park.
Even though these proposals have largely been put forward
with more interactive situations in mind, there seem to be some
basic aspects that the two share: just as in a conversation where
what is said and understood depends on the intentions of the
interlocutors, reading depends on the intentions of the reader. This
has consequences for how reading unfolds over time, behaviorally
and emotionally, and what is remembered afterward from a text
(Hunt and Vipond, 1991). Furthermore, reading depends on the
assumed intentions of the author. The intentions of authors have
also been carefully studied tomake sense of written language across
centuries of exegesis and are necessary in order to understand
the meaning of ironic, satirical or metaphoric statements, which
cannot be understood from their linguistic surface structure alone
(Gibbs, 2002).
Similarly, it has been pointed out that just as “The possibility of
language, thought, and interpretation depends on the triangular
situation which relates speaker and listener, and both to a shared
object in the public world which they can observe together, and
to which they can observe each other’s responses. Such a triangu-
lar situation exists in literature. Interpretations of a text will vary
from person to person, culture to culture, and century to century.
However, it does not follow that a text means whatever its readers
take it to mean, since disagreements about the meaning of a text
are only possible against a shared basis of agreement” (Davidson,
1993), highlighting how the process of reading as a communica-
tive process is related to other forms of communication, such as
conversation, and how intersubjective contexts necessarily factor
into the reading situation.
Turning back to contemporary reading research, these asser-
tions bring up the interesting question of howone should judge the
experimental situations that are dominantly used to study reading
from this perspective? Asmost reading tasks feature reading of iso-
lated, random letter strings, or a few sentences at the most, many
of the aspects that are considered necessary pre-condition for the
reading process in literary studies and the philosophy of languages
are virtually absent in the empirical investigations of reading.
These doubts set aside, there are not only interesting conceptual
commonalities between reading and conversation as communica-
tive processes, but they also share similarities with respect to their
dynamic structure, with respect to basic patterns of behavior that
can be observed in both: both exhibit kinds of feedback loops
in behavior, such as in conversations where interlocutors go back
and forth to clarify terminology and topic, until common ground
is established (Clark, 1996). In reading, similar feed-back loops
are evident to secure proper understanding of a text, such as re-
reading previous text passages (Rayner et al., 2006), together with
reﬂective thought processes which now substitute for communica-
tive exchange. Similarly, when understanding is jeopardized or a
new topic is introduced, one observes disruptions of otherwise
rather “smoothly” proceeding processes in conversation as well as
in reading. As we will see in the next two sections, such dynamic
aspects of the reading process will be important to provide a mea-
sure of basic aspects of language use that can be employed in
reading research. But ﬁrst we will need to ﬁnd a core concept
of language use that motivates a particular operational deﬁnition
that can be employed in reading research, and that provides an
interpretational dimension for its measures. In the next section, I
will brieﬂy introduce Wittgenstein’s concept of “language games,”
and show how it captures a basic aspect of language use that can
be applied in the context of reading.
LANGUAGE GAMES: A FUNDAMENTAL ASPECT OF
LANGUAGE USE
Wittgenstein introduces “language games” in his Philosophical
Investigations as a concept that holds together the great diversity
of language activities that can be observed. After describing the
sensitivity of meaning in language to the various contextual con-
straints that one can identify, Wittgenstein reasoned that natural
language-use is not governed by a general process that underlies
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all of those instances, but that it is inherently dependent on histor-
ical, social and other contextual factors (Wittgenstein, 1953/2010).
Hence, natural language is not a homogenous category that can
be deﬁned by a small set of general language-rules or language-
elements that hold across all contexts, but it is rather composed
of different classes of language use, for which Wittgenstein coined
the term “language game.” In analogy to real games, Wittgenstein
pointed out that language games possess rules according to which
language is used within each game, but that different games dif-
fer in terms of the rules that govern use. Furthermore, the rules
observed in each game are emergent. That is, even though they
seem to have real causal power within the same family of lan-
guage games, they do not point to any fundamental principles
of how language generally works. The rules do not transcend the
boundaries of the particular language game within which they are
observed.
Again, when reading the Philosophical Investigations, it seems
clear that Wittgenstein had more social, dialogical situations in
mind, than a person reading a book. However, as we have brieﬂy
discussed in the previous section, reading, and conversation share
a good deal of conceptual and behavioral similarity, to warrant an
analogy between language games and“reading games.” If we try to
use the idea of language games for reading, then we are interested
in how this concept relates to the current state of reading research
and its challenges. Furthermore, of course, we are also interested
in how it can be utilized for the empirical investigation of reading.
Regarding the question of how reading games tie in with the
state-of-affairs in reading research that was summarized at the
beginning of this manuscript, the crucial point to take from
the application of language games to reading is that the differ-
ences between two reading games (that is, reading situations such
as reading silently or aloud, reading in English or reading in
Hebrew, or reading prose or poetry), can be both, quantitative
and qualitative: reading games that belong to the same family
exhibit similar rules, while reading games that belong to dif-
ferent families abide by potentially completely different sets of
rules (Wittgenstein, 1953/2010).This makes immediately under-
standable why the effect-landscape observed in current reading
research is so heterogeneous: contextual variations and exper-
imental manipulations do sometimes not just constitute mere
quantitative changes in the manipulated factor, but can effectively
constitute a change from one type of reading game into another,
changing reading qualitatively. However, in the absence of a deﬁni-
tion of the boundary conditions within which a particular reading
game is stable and only quantitative variations occur, a particu-
lar experimental variation that looks rather moderate from the
perspective of the researcher (such as reading a word silently or
aloud – Forster and Chambers, 1973) can tip a reading game, not
just changing a particular aspect of that game, but turn it into
a new game that works according to entirely different rules alto-
gether. If one buys into reading games as a fundamental concept,
this explains why reading research is so diverse, and scientists keep
being surprised by entirely unexpected context effects, for instance
the relative insensitivity of the reading process to letter-position in
some languages (Frost, 2012) or the continued interaction between
task-aspects and reading performance that stress or suppress the
role of phonology in reading (Van Orden and Kloos, 2005).
Also, I have stressed the tension between single-word and con-
nected text reading. However, there are of course instances were
naturalistic reading is reading of only oneword, and the concept of
reading games gives a proper role to the case of single-word read-
ing in naturalistic settings: even though the case of text-reading
seems to be the standard that reading research aims at explaining,
everyday life is of course full of examples where only one or two
words convey information. For example imagine somebody sit-
ting in a restaurant and starting to feel the sudden urge to visit the
restroom. Of course, this person will get up, look for a sign saying
“restroom” (or “toilet,” or “WC”), and have that sign guide their
searching behavior. The sign means then“toilet,” or perhaps“place
where on can relieve oneself in private.”However, the understand-
ing of the word is a function seminar to the triadic relation that
Davidson (1993) described, where the reader needs to have a cer-
tain intention with regard to the word “restroom,” the word needs
to be presented in a particular context, and the intention of the
(proximate) author, in our case perhaps the restaurant owner, to
provide guidance for her customers. Imagine the person seeking
for a restroom sees the word “restroom” as part of an advertise-
ment for American Standard water closets. This will surely evoke
a different behavior and understanding of that word.
Furthermore, one must not forget that investigating how
a person understands a word for scientiﬁc psychology means
observe behavior in response to the word, and different contexts
(“restroom” in the context of restroom and“restroom” in the con-
text of advertisement) will elicit very different behaviors. While
this is intuitive for understanding in these everyday situations,
one has to wonder what participants in psychological laboratory
tasks understand when they read random word lists on a com-
puter screen – what are the intentions of the participants with
regard to/regarding the text stimuli, and what are the intentions
of the author that factor into reading here?
Regarding the question of how the concept of reading games
can be used for the empirical investigations of reading, the crucial
point to take away is that what is unifying across reading games is
not the presence of a particular set of rules that applies throughout
all contexts (such as that high frequent words that occur often in a
language are read faster compared to low frequent words), but that
reading games are always rule-abiding, exerting a structuring effect
on reading behavior (such a set of locomotion patterns for some-
body looking for a restroom in response to the sign “restroom”).
This rule-abiding aspect of reading games can serve as a new fun-
dament for reading research and solve the outlined problems – i.e.,
what is the common core across systematic idiosyncrasies in read-
ing behavior between different readers, what is common across
reading in different languages and situations, and how one can
deﬁne the (text-)reading process in the absence of a strong and
stable relationship between surface properties of the text (such as
lexical word features) and reading behavior.
Regarding reader idiosyncratic differences in reading behavior
between readers, the reading game conceptionwould allowus relax
the degree of detail that we need to explicitly address, for example
when investigating the question whether two readers that read the
same text but in very different ways (i.e., many short saccades and
ﬁxations with frequent regression compared to few long ﬁxations
and saccades with few regressive eye-movements) possess a similar
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or different degree of aptitude in reading or comprehension of a
text. From the reading game perspective, we could hypothesize
that the better a reader abides by the rules of a reading game, the
better she is able to utilize (con-)textual information and thus the
better of a reader she is. That is, no matter what form the speciﬁc
rules of a reading game take, the more one abides by the rules,
the better the game is played – no matter what speciﬁc behav-
ioral pattern a reader exhibits during reading, the key-question is
to what extent this patter reﬂects a rule-abiding reading process
or not.
We can make a similar argument for the other two cases,
reading in different languages and text reading: reading in two
languages might exhibit differences in how readers utilize certain
word features (e.g., English vs. Hebrew), and somewriting systems
might even exhibit word features that nothing others do not even
possess (e.g., English vs. Mandarin), but proﬁcient reading should
always be a structured, rule-abiding activity, as there will be some
systematic aspects in the relation between reader and text within
each writing system. Similarly, for text reading, we would require
that a reader who reads and understands a text exhibits some form
of structured behavior during reading, even if this structure can-
not be pinned down to speciﬁc features of the text in a general
manner.
Furthermore, the concept of rule-abidingness in reading games
might be used to empirically sort-out the boundary conditions
up to which the same reading rules apply (e.g., that high fre-
quent words are read faster), or at which they change (e.g., that
high-frequent words are read substantially faster in isolated word
reading tasks, but not during connected text reading – Wallot
et al., 2013). This can be done because reading games provide us
with a bottom-up deﬁnition of the boundary conditions between
any two qualitatively different reading contexts: when a reader
moves from one reading game to another that differs in rules,
then this will lead to a disruption of rule-abiding behavior at the
transition-point between the two games, as the established rules
of the ﬁrst game are broken while the new rules of the second
game are still being established. In contrast, if a reader moves
between two reading games that share the same set of rules, the
degree of rule-abidingness will remain stable at the transition-
point between games. However, in order to test such a hypothesis,
one needs an operational deﬁnition of a reading game to measure
such effects in empirical data. In the next and last section of this
manuscript, I consider possible statistical operationalizations of
the reading game concept, and review some preliminary evidence
of the utility of the concept.
READING GAMES: POSSIBLE OPERATIONALIZATIONS
Following the conceptual clariﬁcation, what is needed is an oper-
ationalization of the concept of reading games, or to be more
precise, the degree of rule-abidingness in measures of reading.
Here, an important note is in order: when thinking of rule-abiding
reading behavior, it is not implied that the rules are consciously
understood or explicitly followed by the reader. What is rather
meant, is that measures of reading behavior in a particular context
are not random, but follow systematic patterns that can be formu-
lated as a rule by an observer, such as “the higher the frequency of
a word, the faster that word is read by a reader.”
The conception of rule-abidingness in a reading game that is
presented here is in some respect very similar to the standard
assumptions that go into current theories of reading: if a reader
aptly reads a text (or word), comprehends it (sufﬁciently) and
acts in accordance with it (for example by moving their gaze fur-
ther along a text, or opening the door that leads to a restroom
as opposed to out into the kitchen), this implies that the text
constraints the reader’s (reading) behavior, and that the reading
behavior that can be measured is somehow coupled to the text.
However, if the reading game analogy holds, then it will – for
many cases – be problematic or impossible to formulate the other
side of the equation in a general manner, that is, to what aspects
of the text the reader’s behavior is coupled to and in what way.
As I have discussed, simple reading tasks that allow next to zero
variation on the side of the reader and carefully try to investigate
only one factor of reading at a time already fail to yield a stable
pattern of general mechanisms that guide the reading process.
One should not expect to fare any better as the complexity of the
stimulus material and the degrees of freedom on the side of the
reader are scaled up. Hence, quantifying the degree of order in
reading behavior is an attempt to deﬁne the degree of coupling
between text and reader when access to only one of the two is
possible.
Hence, we seek a measure of rule-abidingness that tells us how
structured a particular measure of reading (e.g., eye-movements
or prosody of a voice record during reading) is without having to
specify where the structure comes from in detail. Such measures
can be taken from the toolbox of statistical physics (such as permu-
tation entropy analysis, Bandt and Pompe, 2002; cross-convergent
mapping, Sugihara et al., 2012; recurrence quantiﬁcation analysis,
Webber and Zbilut, 2005; or fractal characteristics, Wallot et al.,
2012). These methods provide measures of the degree of temporal
structure and predictability in time-series, and could lend them-
selves to an operational deﬁnition of rule-abidingness of language
games, because they extract and quantify the degree of temporal
structure without the need to deﬁne the rules a priori. Further-
more, they are non-linear methods that are able to detect rules in
time-series that do not follow any simple, obvious patterns, such
as chaotic time-series that appear random, but are in fact deter-
ministic (Zbilut et al., 1998). This is important because the crux
with strong unexpected context effects is that when they occur,
the rules of the new context are not yet well understood, and can
thus not be easily formulated on the grounds of the rules observed
in previous contexts. However, as has been described above, by
simply quantifying the degree of temporal structure, we are able
to distinguish between different reading games, also in the absence
of more detailed knowledge.
The example in Figure 1 illustrates this point by showing
how such a measure of temporal structure can be used to cap-
ture transitions between two qualitatively different behaviors. The
data was generated by the Lorenz system, an equation system
that consists of three coupled differential equations (Figure 1A).
Depending on the parameterization of the system, it is capable
of exhibiting different types of dynamics. When the parameters
are changed accordingly, the system transitions from one type of
behavior (a stable ﬁx point) to another (oscillating behavior). This
is also evident in a one-dimensional “measurement” of the system
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science August 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 891 | 10
Wallot Reading games
FIGURE 1 | (A) 3D illustration of a switching between two attractors (i.e.,
two quantitatively different types of behavior) in the Lorenz system, a
coupled differential equation system consisting of three equations. When
going through a phase-transition (i.e., moving from one attractor to
another), the system does not show a smooth or instantaneous transition
between the two attractor-states, but produces a transition period with
major displacement. (B) Time-series of a single dimension of the Lorenz
system that shows the behavior in the ﬁrst attractor, the behavior in
second attractor, and the transition phase. The behavior within each
attractor looks very different, and the transition phase is marked by a
period of increased ﬂuctuation. (C) Recurrence plot (RP) of the time-series
in (B). Recurrence plots are 2-dimensional representations of a time-series
where time moves from the lower-left part of the plot to the upper-right
part along the diagonal of the matrix. Dark areas in the plot indicate a high
degree of temporal structure in the behavior of the time-series. White areas
represent the absence of temporal structure in the time-series. The RP is
similar to an autocorrelation plot, where time at lag0 runs along the
diagonal. As one moves away from the diagonal toward the upper-left or
lower-right part of the plot, one sees time-lagged behavior. Hence, the plot
shows that the initial behavior (i.e., behavior in attractor 1) is highly
structured, indicated by the dark area in the lower-left. Similarly, behavior in
attractor 2 is highly structured, indicated by the striped area in the
upper-right. However, the transition period between the two attractors is
marked by a brief absence of structure. (D) Illustration of an RP-based
measure of structuredness (%Determinism) of the time-series in (B). For
both attractors, 1 and 2, the time-series possesses a high degree of
temporal structure, but the transition between both attractors is marked
by a loss of structure, indicated by the dip in %Determinism.
(Figure 1B), which could be thought of as analogous to a time-
series of word reading time during text reading, for example. To
quantify the degree of temporal structure, the one-dimensional
time-series can be represented as a recurrence plot that shows the
degree of structure within that time-series (Figure 1C). From the
recurrence plot, one can nowderive statistics of temporal structure
(Webber and Zbilut, 2005) in the original time-series (Figure 1D).
As can be seen, both types of behavior exhibit a high degree
of temporal structure, but the transition point between them is
marked by a brief loss in that structure, indicating a change from
one behavior to the other. This example does not only illustrate
how a change in temporal structure can be detected, it also high-
lights another important point about the reading game concept: as
mentioned earlier, Wittgenstein described that the rules observed
in language-use dot not point to the foundations of language,
but are themselves emergent features of language-use-in-context.
Similarly, the Lorenz system can exhibit oscillatory behavior, but
the fact that oscillations are observed is not in a straight-forward
way informative about its architecture, as it, for example, does
not include a sinusoidal function. When the behavioral rules are
emergent, such as the oscillations in the Lorenz system, and the
system moves from one type of behavior to another, then the tran-
sition is unsmooth, creating an abrupt drop in the structuredness
of behavior (Kelso, 1995). Hence, if the rules that govern reading
behavior are similarly emergent, as the concept of reading games
holds, then such transitions will necessarily occur when shifting
between two qualitatively different reading contexts, predicting
the formation of a new reading game.
To illustrate the effect for reading, I collected a set of pilot
data to provide a proof-of-concept of the reading game pro-
posal, namely that the degree of temporal structure in reading
can provide a bottom-up deﬁnition of the boundaries between
two reading games. In a self-paced reading task, participants read
a text of 1099 words. The ﬁrst half of the text was randomized,
effectively providing an individual word reading task that is used
in most reading studies, while the second half of the text was left
intact. The time-series of reading times is displayed in a recurrence
plot (as in Figure 1), which is used to compute temporal structure
within a reading time-series. As can be seen in Figure 2, individual
word reading and text reading appear as two qualitatively different
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FIGURE 2 | Pilot data from one participant during self-paced reading.The
ﬁrst 530 words were presented as randomized words. Thereafter, words
appear as an ordered connected text. The upper panel shows the time-series
of word reading times. The lower panel shows the RP of that reading
time-series. Similar to the change between attractor-states presented in
Figure 1, one can see that reading of randomized words (reading game 1) and
reading of a connected text (reading game 2) are both temporally structured
(as evident by black areas in the plot). Furthermore, the transition from
random word reading to connected text reading is neither instantaneous, nor
smooth, as indicated by the transition-phase that connects the two reading
conditions. Lastly, it can be seen that random word reading and text reading
are different in terms of how they are temporally organized, as the off-
diagonal areas in the upper-left and lower right area are white, indicating no
shared temporal structure between word and text reading.
tasks: while each of them shows a speciﬁc global reading pattern,
there is basically no overlap between those patterns, as indicated
by the white spaces to the upper-left and lower-right off the main
diagonal. Furthermore, this distinction also predicts a “change in
rules” between the two tasks: while word frequency plays a sub-
stantial role in individual word reading (R2 = 0.046; p < 0.001),
this decreases to a marginal effect in text reading (R2 = 0.006;
p = 0.061).
Furthermore, in a recent set of studies, we utilized recurrence
quantiﬁcation analysis on text reading data to assess reading per-
formance of children and adults and for the prediction of text
comprehension: in one study (O’Brien et al., 2014), children (2nd,
4th, and 6th graders) and adults read a simple children’s story
silently or aloud in a self-paced manner. That is, participants
always pressed a button to reveal each new word of the story,
read the word, and pressed the button again to reveal the next
word of the text. Hence, the intervals between two consecutive
button presses estimated the reading time of that word (Just et al.,
1982). It was found that recurrence measures that quantify the
temporal structure in reading times increase with age and distin-
guish better between readers of different age than reading rate.
In an investigation of reading process predictors of text com-
prehension (Wallot et al., accepted), we found that the degree
of temporal structure of reading times turned out to be a good
predictor of text comprehension in both, silent and oral read-
ing, and again better than reading speed. A third study on the
effect of repeated reading also found that repeated text read-
ing, which is thought to increase reading ﬂuency for that text,
led to increases in temporal structure of reading times for less
skilled readers, even though the pattern of effects was not as clear
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as in O’Brien et al. (2014) or Wallot et al. (accepted). Generally,
these results ﬁt with the reading game conception, where rule-
abidingness – as measured by the degree of temporal structure
in reading times – indicates mastery of a reading game and thus
should relate positively to reading skill and text comprehension.
Moreover, these ﬁndings tie in with new research on conversa-
tion during dyadic interaction, where the degree of temporal
shared structure in utterances between interlocutors positively
correlated with the success of the interaction on a shared deci-
sion making task (Fusaroli and Tylén, under review). This seems
to indicate that temporal structure lends itself as a measure of
rule-abidingness, which can serve as a general indicator of skilled
language use – be it reading or conversation – in the language game
conception.
Of course, the evidence presented comes from a single case
of reading or is based on retrospective interpretations of already
published work, and proper prospective data to test some of
the basic predictions of the language game conceptions need to
be collected. Nevertheless, these ﬁndings lend some motivation
that the concept of reading games can serve as a fruitful and
fundamental property of reading, that circumvents some of the
conceptual problems of contemporary theories of reading, espe-
cially their take onmeaning. To utilize and explore the value of this
conception, ﬁrst investigations are needed that solve basic mea-
surement issues, such aswhatmeasures of temporal structure (e.g.,
RQA, CCM, entropy measures, correlation dimensions) make
for sensitive and reliable operationalizations of rule-abidingness,
and whether and how they converge. Then, subsequent inves-
tigations might shed light at more speciﬁc hypotheses, such
as whether rule-abidingness can be used to predict differences
between qualitatively different reading tasks, or serve as a general
metric for skilled language use across readers, texts and lan-
guages, and connect reading to back to the broader ﬁeld of human
communication.
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